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RESUME: Locke a apporte des changements significatifs a plusieurs points de sa
psychologie morale aufil des cinq premieres editions de /'Essay. Jeferai valoir qu'en
acceptant une certaine liberti de la volonti ('willing^ dans sa correspondance avec
van Limborch (1702) et en concidant une certaine «liberti eu egard a la volonte»
dans la cinquieme edition de /'Essay (1706), Locke ne comprometpas la coherence
de sa position definitive, contenue dans la cinquieme edition, ces libertis etant dis-
tinctes du genre de libre arbitre qu'il rejette a maintes reprises. Je tenterai de sou-
ligner la continuity de la pensie de Locke sur la liberti humaine enfaisant appel a
sa theorie de la liberti de penser, qui n'a cesse d'evoluer des la premiere edition.
Without Liberty the Understanding would be to no purpose:
And without Understanding, Liberty (if it could be) would sig-
nify nothing.
Essay, II, 21 §67
The chapter of Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding that
deals with the question of freedom (II, 21: "Of Power") is the longest of
Book II. It underwent extensive revisions during the Essay's five first edi-
tions,1 some of which are acknowledged by Locke in II, 21, §§71-72, and
in the Epistle to the Reader, where he says, "I have found reason some-
what to alter the thoughts I formerly had concerning that, which gives
the last determination to the Will in all voluntary action."2 Several
changes are due to Locke's recognition and explanation, in the second
edition, of weakness of the will, absent in the first edition. His explana-
Dialogue XLII (2003), 695-724
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696 Dialogue
tion depends on two issues, duly discussed in the second and subsequent
editions: (1) the causal role of the psychological state of uneasiness, and
(2) the power to suspend one's desires. All three themes—weakness of the
will, uneasiness, suspension of desires—belong to moral psychology. How-
ever, we also find another significant modification. Locke repeatedly says
that free will is impossible, but in the fifth edition he inserts a passage in
which he affirms a certain sort of "Liberty in respect of willing" (§56).
Three questions arise. Firstly, given that there is some disagreement
among commentators as to the nature of Locke's "Liberty in respect of will-
ing," what exactly is it? Secondly, is the belated acceptance of this sort of
freedom compatible with Locke's firm and constant rejection of free will? I
wish to show that it is: the freedom in respect of willing that he tardily
accepts is substantially different from the doctrine of free will that he
opposes. Thirdly, given that in §47 Locke identifies something as that which
his opponents improperly call "free will," we need to find out how that
relates to "Liberty in respect of willing." Furthermore, it has been argued
that Locke's acceptance of freedom in respect of willing goes hand in hand
with a rejection of volitional determinism.31 would like to show that this is
not the case; Locke's acceptance of "Liberty in respect of willing" does not
bring him to reject volitional determinism.4 His change of mind concerning
freedom to will is merely another amendment to his moral psychology, and
is compatible both with the thesis according to which all volitions are caus-
ally determined, and with the thesis according to which free will, as Locke
understands it, is impossible. These issues are addressed in Sections 4 and 5.
Sections 1 to 3 cover some preliminary ground related to my main pur-
pose, however, which is to understand the connection between the three
changes regarding uneasiness, suspension of desire, and freedom in
respect of willing. I wish to show that the three additions, far from being
unrelated, are part and parcel of a coherent doctrine. I would also like to
show that, although the doctrine emerges gradually from the first edition
to the fifth, it highlights the increasing importance of something that was
present from the very outset in the first edition: freedom of thinking.
Locke gradually comes to realize that he must give freedom of thinking a
more prominent role within his moral psychology than he previously had.
The three alterations are made for that purpose, so this article attempts
to underscore the continuity of Locke's thought on human freedom
throughout his changes of mind, the guiding thread being freedom of
thinking. This should hardly come as a surprise, given that Locke's very
definition of a person comprises not only responsibility and a profound
concern for happiness, but also thought, reason, and intelligence.5
1. Volition and Voluntary Action
The will is an active power; its exercise is a volition. Whereas the will is a
disposition, a volition is an actual entity. This seemingly trivial point is
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Locke's Theory of Human Freedom 697
important to keep in mind in connection with Locke's insistence that fac-
ulties or powers, whether passive or active, are not agents.6 This implies two
things according to Locke. Firstly, it is a category mistake to say that one
power has another power. A power is just not the sort of thing that can have
a power. Powers necessarily belong to substances, and an active mental
power, such as the will, belongs to a substance that is an agent. Secondly,
it is a further category mistake to say that a power acts; only an agent can
act. And to act is for an agent to exercise one of her active powers.
According to Locke the only effect of a volition is an agent's action:
"the will or power of Volition is conversant about nothing, but our own
Actions; terminates there; and reaches no farther" (§30). As another quo-
tation shows below, a volition is not directed to just any possible action,
but only to a possible action that one believes to be in one's power. There
are two kinds of human actions, bodily movements and thoughts.7 One's
bodily movement or one's thought are voluntary if, and only if, they are
directly caused by one's volition to perform them: "The forbearance or
performance of that action, consequent to such order or command of the
mind, is called Voluntary. And whatsoever action is performed without
such a thought of the mind is called Involuntary."*
What is a volition ? Locke makes no attempt to conceal the difficulty
he encounters in trying to explain what a volition is; he openly writes with
much hesitation in §§15, 28, and 30. Yet, the difficulty he encounters is an
interesting one; it reveals the complexity of his notion of a volition. On
the one hand, a volition is a mental act that can be expressed by verbs such
as "commanding," "ordering," "directing," "choosing," or "preferring."
Such verbs show that a volition is an operation that necessarily depends
in some measure on the perception of ideas, for one can do none of the
things expressed by these verbs unless one has an idea of the action that
one believes to be in one's power, and that one chooses, prefers, com-
mands, or orders oneself to do. And because what one chooses, orders,
etc., is an action that one believes to be conducive—either alone or along
with a series of other actions—to the attainment of some good that one
desires, then one must also have an idea of the desired good.
On the other hand, although a Lockean volition is distinct from an
action as cause from effect, it is intimately connected to an "exerting" of
one's power to act, to an attempt or "endeavouring" to act:9 " Volition, or
Willing, is an act of the Mind directing its thought to the production of
any Action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it" (§28); " Volition
is nothing but that particular determination of the mind, whereby, barely
by a thought, the mind endeavours to give rise, continuation, or stop to any
Action, which it takes to be in its power" (§30). By "intimately connected"
I mean that a volition presumably causes the voluntary action in such a
way that, if the action needs some time to be accomplished (for example,
tying one's shoelaces or typing a page), and as long as there are no imped-
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iments to the performing of the action, the volition accompanies the
"exerting" and "endeavouring" from beginning to end, that is to say, until
the action is fully accomplished. This is required if the whole action is to
be voluntary. The second passage also suggests that a volition pertains
only to actions that depend directly on the will, actions that one believes
one is able to perform merely by willing to do so ("barely by a thought").
Precisely because a volition typically causes an endeavouring, an exert-
ing of a power to produce an action (that one believes to be in one's
power), a volition is very different from a desire. One can desire some-
thing without willing, and without trying, to act in order to attain it.
Whereas "Desire is directed to the agreeable, . . . Will is directed only to
our actions and terminates there."10 Although a volition is always caused
by a desire, not every desire causes a volition. Because of this it is possible
to have contrary desires and volitions: "I will the Action, that tends one
way, whilst my desire tends another, and that the direct contrary" (§30).
2. Freedom to Act and Freedom of Thinking
Locke has a relatively fine-grained account of action. His many examples
show that he distinguishes between: beginning to do A (or just doing A);
refraining from beginning to do A (or just refraining from doing A); con-
tinuing to do A (when A is a kind of action that can be continued) in cir-
cumstances where one might hesitate as whether to continue or not; and
ceasing to do A. All of these are ways of acting, and can be done either
voluntarily or involuntarily.11 To make matters simpler for the purposes
of this article, however, let us distinguish merely between doing A and
doing B, where A and B are incompatible or "contrary" actions in the
sense that they cannot be performed simultaneously, although, given
proper circumstances, one could be done instead of the other. For exam-
ple, if A is to stay in a room, B could be to leave the room; if A is to smoke
a cigarette, B could be to refrain from doing so, etc.
Chappell is right to say that Locke is basically a compatibilist, holding
that all actions, free or not, are causally determined.12 What might seem
to make him sound like an incompatibilist, when compared with Hobbes
and Hume, is that he uses "free" and "necessary" as contradictory terms.
But that is only a verbal matter, for in II, 21 "necessary" means "non-
free," not "causally determined." Now, according to Locke, an agent acts
freely in doing some action A if, and only if: (1) A is done voluntarily;
(2) the agent could act otherwise instead and do some contrary action B
(where B might be no more than refraining from doing A). The latter
clause means that it is entirely up to the agent to do B instead of A if she
so wills.n When condition (2) is satisfied, we have what Locke calls "Indif-
ferency of Ability on either side to act" (§10), "an indifferency of the oper-
ative Powers of the Man" (§71). He defines this indifferency negatively as
the absence of both restraint and compulsion, which are two forms of
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what he calls "necessity," i.e., the absence of freedom.14 One does A freely,
then, when one wills to do A in circumstances in which there is no internal
or external restraint preventing one either from doing A or from refrain-
ing from doing A, and no internal or external compulsion forcing one
either to do A or to refrain from doing A.15 It is important to notice, too,
that restraint and compulsion can be either (1) inner, psychological forces,
(2) bodily states (such as palsy or a convulsion16), or (3) external factors.
Thus, indifferency, as understood by Locke, is not a psychological state.
When indifferency relates to bodily action it includes a certain state of the
agent's body and a certain state of her surroundings at the time of acting.
As we shall see, the sort of indifferency essential to freedom of bodily
action and of thought must be distinguished from the "antecedent indif-
ferency before the decree of the Will," which Locke rejects, but which his
opponents take to be necessary to free will.17 Another point to be kept in
mind is that the indifferency essential to freedom to act is jeopardized
only by restraint and/or compulsion, not by causal determinism. That is
to say, an action can be performed freely and yet be causally determined.
Indeed, an action performed freely is voluntary by definition, and so is
always causally determined by a volition. In sum, voluntariness is not a
sufficient condition of an action's being performed freely; it is only a nec-
essary condition. We have three kinds of actions: involuntary (not free,
i.e., necessary), voluntary but not free (necessary), and voluntary and free.
Most of the examples of free action discussed by Locke in II, 21 are
bodily movements. It is important to keep in mind, though, that some
modes of thinking are voluntary actions, too. When Locke first makes the
distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions in II, 21, he applies
it to thought: "This Power which the mind has, thus to order the consid-
eration of any Idea, or the forbearing to consider i t . . . is that which we
call the Will" (§5). Furthermore, in some cases thinking can be performed
freely: "so far as a Man has a power to think, or not to think . . . , accord-
ing to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a Man Free.
Where-ever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a Man's
power . . . , [and] will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind
directing it, there he is not Free, though perhaps the Action may be vol-
untary" (§8). Locke is here explaining freedom of thinking in terms of an
"Indifferency of Ability on either side to act."
In II, 19 Locke gives a list, that he himself considers incomplete, of
what he calls "modes of thinking." Because he includes volitions among
these modes (cf. II, 19, §2), it would be mistaken to oppose volitions to
modes of thinking. However, one can distinguish volitions from a sub-
class of modes of thinking. I wish to contrast, within the class of modes
of thinking (an expression I hereafter drop), (1) volitions with (2) delib-
eration and a variety of acts of thinking which, under certain conditions,
can all be included in a process of deliberation: acts such as thinking of a
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certain idea rather than another, examining an idea attentively, compar-
ing ideas, judging, reasoning, giving one's assent, and so on. Such acts of
thinking are those that we find in Locke's theory of freedom of thinking.
Just as freedom to perform bodily actions is limited, so is freedom of
thinking. For instance, Locke explains to his Dutch Remonstrant friend
Philippus van Limborch that if the expression "act of the understanding"
means "that action by which one perceives that something is true," then
such an act cannot be performed freely. If a man perceives that the sum of
the three angles of a triangle are equal to that of two right angles, he "is
not free because when the demonstration has been examined he is unable
not to understand this."18 Another limitation: while awake, an agent is
"under the necessity of having some Ideas constantly in his Mind, [and] is
not at liberty to think, or not to think" (§12). Yet, the agent is often free to
think of some ideas rather than others. For, if "act of the understanding"
means "an action of thinking about some subject," then "a man is for the
most part free in actions of the understanding of that sort: for example: I
can think about Adam's sin, or remove my cogitation thence to the city of
Rome or to the art of war in the present age. In all these actions I am free
because I am able at my pleasure to think about this or that."19 Such free-
dom is itself limited and can be momentarily impaired by restraint or by
compulsion, as when a man on the rack "is not at liberty to lay by the Idea
of pain, and divert himself with other Contemplations," or when a violent
passion "hurries our Thoughts" and prevents one from considering cer-
tain ideas that one would gladly consider in other circumstances (§12).
When an agent's freedom is not thus impaired, however, he is sometimes
free to consider certain ideas attentively or not: "he may commonly chuse,
whether he will heedfully observe and consider them [his ideas]."20
In sum, freedom of thinking is on a par with freedom of bodily action.
They are structurally identical in all essentials. Both are explained by vol-
untariness, and by "Indifferency of Ability on either side to act"; both are
empirically limited. If freedom of bodily action is compatible with causal
determinism, as Locke holds, then so is freedom of thinking.
In §§5-12, freedom of thinking and freedom of bodily action are dis-
cussed as if they were two parallel, unconnected domains of freedom, with
the agent pictured as controlling by will (in some measure) acts of think-
ing on the inside, and bodily actions on the outside. Of course, this provi-
sional picture is an oversimplification, because voluntary bodily action
depends on thought. A volition is always a volition to do some action that
the agent considers within her power, so it depends on an idea of that
action and on an idea of the agent's power; because a volition is caused
by a desire, it also depends, indirectly, on the idea of some desired good.
More will be said about volition and thinking in the next sections. Let
us mention here that each and every volition also depends on what Locke
calls a "last judgement" of the understanding.21 What is a judgement? It
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is an act of the understanding, but not an act of perceiving the agreement
or disagreement of ideas. It is an act "whereby the Mind takes its Ideas to
agree, or disagree; or which is the same, any Proposition to be true, or
false, without perceiving a demonstrative Evidence in the Proofs"; it is an
act where "Agreement or Disagreement is not perceived, but presumed"
(IV, 14, §§3 and 4). Judgements are made, typically, with regard to com-
plex, contingent matters, where, instead of certain knowledge, we have
only probability. In some cases judgements are voluntary: "Assent, Sus-
pense, or Dissent, are often voluntary Actions" (IV, 20, §15). Sometimes,
too, one is free to assent or to withhold assent as one wills. This is the case
in two sorts of situations. It is the case, firstly, when one wishes to take a
stand on an issue involving two alternative possible courses of action
where the probability is perceived to be approximately equal on both
sides. (However, as soon as the probability is perceived to be significantly
greater on one side than the other, it is not within one's power to refrain
from assenting.22) This sort of "freedom" to assent or to withhold assent
is not a positive power; it is a sign and consequence of ignorance. Sec-
ondly, one can withhold assent merely by breaking off one's present
enquiry and directing one's thoughts elsewhere: "we can hinder both
Knowledge and Assent, by stopping our Enquiry, and not imploying our
Faculties in the search of any Truth" (IV, 20, §16). If one is free to pursue
or to refrain from pursuing an "enquiry," then one is surely also some-
times free to begin to deliberate or to refrain from doing so. This suggests
that deliberation can sometimes be performed freely.
What is a "last" judgement? It is a judgement that immediately precedes
and determines a volition. Locke says that it is "about the thing to be
done,"23 that is to say, about an action proposed to the understanding and
presumed to be within one's power. But it is not "about" an action in the
same sense in which a volition is. A volition is "about" an action in that it
is always a volition to do (or to refrain from doing) something. A "last
judgement," on the other hand, is an evaluative judgement having the gen-
eral form: "this [is] better for here and now." One might say that it is
"about" an action in that it has as its object a proposition about the action,
one of the form "this [is] better for here and now."24 One should not con-
fuse a last judgement with a desire. A desire is always aimed at a good
thing, whereas a last judgement is "about" (in the sense mentioned above)
an action presumed to lie within one's power, and proposed to the under-
standing as a step towards attaining that good. However, as Locke makes
clear to van Limborch, a last judgement is not necessarily a "mature and
right judgement"; it does not necessarily result from deliberation, for
"that judgement. . . which is in reality the last judgement" is so "whether
it has been well pondered and recast by mature deliberation, or is extem-
poraneous and sprung from a sudden impulse; and equally determines the
will, whether or not it is in accordance with reason." This is why "every
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single volition is always preceded by some judgement of the understanding
about the thing to be done."25 Thus, one should not construe the exercise
of the understanding as merely that of making judgements on very general
issues, such as whether this or that sort of good should be pursued. The
exercise of the understanding, whether rashly or carefully conducted, also
determines which specific action is to be performed hie et nunc.
What is important for the purposes of this paper is that a last judge-
ment is sometimes the result of deliberation, and that, because delibera-
tion is an exercise of thought, in some cases at least deliberation can be
performed freely. This means that in some cases, morally significant or
not, the agent acts according to the last judgement of her deliberation in
such a way that both her deliberation and her bodily action are performed
freely. In such situations, we have freedom to act (bodily movement), we
have freedom to think and deliberate; yet, according to Locke, we do not
have free will. And one may well wonder why not. I must postpone dis-
cussing Locke's reasons for rejecting free will until Section 5. More must
be said, before that, about Locke's moral psychology and about freedom
of thinking (Sections 3 and 4).
3. Uneasiness and Freedom of Thinking
Free actions are causally determined by volitions. What are volitions
caused by? In the first edition of the Essay Locke held that they are directly
determined by ideas of a certain good: "'tis as much a perfection, that the
power of Preferring [the will] should be determined by Good, as that the
power of Acting should be determined by the Will; and the certainer such
determination is, the greater the perfection."26 One of the theoretical mod-
ifications made in the second edition is that what immediately determines
a volition is no longer the idea of a certain good, but a conative, motiva-
tional state, an uneasiness closely connected to a desire for some absent
good represented by an idea. So, in the second edition, Locke says: "Good
and Evil, present and absent, 'tis true, work upon the mind: But that which
immediately determines the Will, from time to time, to every voluntary
Action, is the uneasiness of desire, fixed on some absent good."27 Thus, the
uneasiness of desire is fitted into the psychological causal chain as an
intermediate link between the idea of a good and the volition. Determin-
ism is unaffected by the change; the causal chain merely acquires an inter-
mediate link.28
What moved Locke to change his mind? In the first edition he took it
for granted—as "a maxim" received "by the general consent of all Man-
kind"—that "the greater good, determines the will" (§35). In the second
edition he corrects this view: "I am forced to conclude, that good, the
greater good, though apprehended and acknowledged to be so, does not
determine the will, until our desire, raised proportionably to it, makes us
uneasy in the want of it" (§35). According to Locke, the theory of uneas-
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iness is justified both by "Experience" and by "the reason of the thing"
(§33). Weakness of the will is one of the facts of experience, according to
Locke, that can be explained only if we grant that it is some uneasiness,
not the idea of a certain good, that directly motivates one to will. Let us
focus on just two points in Locke's explanation of weakness of the will.29
Firstly, it often happens that some ideas of absent great goods produce no
uneasiness, and so have no effect on the will.30 Secondly, even when we
consider ideas of absent goods that all happen to produce their respective
uneasinesses, there is frequently some disproportion between the compar-
ative greatness or smallness of the represented goods and the comparative
strength or weakness of their corresponding uneasinesses.31 That is to say,
an idea of an absent good, believed by the agent to be a much lesser good
than another absent good represented by another idea, may yet produce
a much stronger uneasiness than the one caused by the idea of the good
believed to be greater. In both cases the agent acknowledges a good to be
greater than others: "Tis not for want of viewing the greater good: for he
sees, and acknowledges it" (§35). Yet, either he is unmotivated to pursue
the greater good (its idea produces no uneasiness), or he is insufficiently
motivated to do so (its idea produces a weaker uneasiness than does an
idea of an acknowledged lesser good). Of course, Locke does not believe
that his theory of uneasiness is required merely to explain weakness of the
will; he uses it to explain human action in general.32 Accordingly, the gen-
eral theory of uneasiness depends on two claims that hold for the expla-
nation of ordinary action as well as for cases of weakness of the will:
(1) two uneasinesses cannot simultaneously cause two volitions, for we are
"capable but of one determination of the will to one action at once" (§36);
(2) whenever an agent has different uneasinesses at the same time, the one
that "has the precedency in determining the will" is "that ordinarily, which
is the most pressing of those, that are judged capable of being then
removed" (§40, my italics).
Before addressing the issue of suspension of desire, let us see how
Locke's theory of uneasiness relates to the power of thought. On the one
hand, an agent's mere thinking of good things has no immediate effect on
her willing, because the mere having ideas of absent goods, however great,
is not sufficient by itself to motivate one to will to act towards attaining
these goods. On the other hand, though, an agent's thinking of goods has
a mediate effect on her willing, because some ideas of absent goods nev-
ertheless do produce uneasinesses that successively determine the will.
The ideas that do so are ideas of absent goods that the agent believes con-
ducive to the (partial) satisfaction of her general desire for happiness. But
there is much more to the relation between thinking and willing, for the
question obviously arises as to how an agent, when possible, can bring it
about that an idea of a great absent good either (1) produces some uneas-
iness if it has not yet done so, or (2) strengthens an uneasiness if the uneas-
Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300005710
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 10 Jul 2017 at 16:58:22, subject to the Cambridge
704 Dialogue
iness it has produced is considered disproportionately weak, or weakens
one that is considered disproportionately strong. And in case the agent
realizes that she suffers from weakness of the will, the question arises
more generally as to how she can work towards bringing it about, when
possible, that her various, competing uneasinesses, according to their
respective strength or weakness, more appropriately fit the greatness or
smallness of the absent goods that she believes conducive to the (partial)
satisfaction of her general desire for happiness. For instance, how does
one see to it that a weaker desire is "raised proportionably" to the idea of
a greater good so that it "makes us uneasy in the want of it"? Nothing less
than such a power is required if agents are to be rational moral persons
working to attain their true happiness.
What is needed is "due and repeated Contemplation" of the idea of a
certain great, absent good, so as to bring "it nearer to our Mind," to give
us "some relish of it," to raise "in us some desire; which then beginning
to make a part of our present uneasiness, stands upon fair terms with the
rest, to be satisfied" (§45). "And thus, by a due consideration and exam-
ining any good proposed, it is in our power, to raise our desires, in a due
proportion to the value of that good, whereby in its turn, and place, it may
come to work upon the will, and be pursued" (§46). Hence, we have "a
power to raise our desires," and that power is the understanding, the
power of thinking: it consists in the careful, attentive consideration and
examination of ideas of absent goods. And this power cannot be restricted
to the mere perception of such ideas taken individually. It must also
extend to the comparison of several ideas of goods, so as to focus on the
"Connexion or Repugnancy, Agreement or Disagreement, that there is
between . . . our Ideas." Or, if we lack certain knowledge and must rely on
probable judgement, we must at least be able to presume agreement or dis-
agreement between certain ideas. Indeed, one must be able to compare the
various ideas of the proposed absent goods one with another, and with
the idea of our happiness, in order to judge which of the goods should, or
should not, be pursued according to the circumstances. Now, the exercises
of the understanding are sometimes voluntary, "the will having a power
over, and directing the thoughts, as well as other actions" (§38). And, as
we have seen, to a certain extent this power can be exercised freely. Indeed,
it has to be exercised freely in some cases, for the whole point of deliber-
ation is that, when one is confronted with various ideas of absent goods
and one has the intention of trying to bring about some change in the
respective strength or weakness of one's uneasinesses towards them, one's
understanding must be in a state of "Indifferency of Ability on either side
to act." That is to say, it must be possible for the agent to attentively con-
sider at will, or to refrain from doing so at will, now the idea of this absent
good, now the idea of that, now the idea of that other, and, if still in
doubt, to reconsider any of the previous ideas, etc., so as to repeatedly
Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300005710
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 10 Jul 2017 at 16:58:22, subject to the Cambridge
Locke's Theory of Human Freedom 705
examine and compare them for so long as it takes to reach a last judge-
ment that determines exactly what specific action should be undertaken
hie et nunc. This is freedom of thinking during deliberation.
Thus, Locke's first important addition to the second and subsequent edi-
tions of the Essay—his theory of uneasiness—is closely connected to his
theory of freedom of thinking already present in the first edition. The theory
of uneasiness is not merely that it is always some uneasiness that immedi-
ately determines a volition, motivates one to will. It is also that uneasinesses
can in some limited measure be produced, strengthened, or weakened by the
voluntary and free exercise of the understanding in deliberation.
At this point, it should be said that Locke's position in the previously
quoted letter to van Limborch may seem to be somewhat at odds with the
main line that Locke takes in Essay II, 21 as to what immediately deter-
mines the will. According to II, 21, what immediately determines the will
is an uneasiness. Yet, Locke explains to van Limborch (in 1701) that a last
judgement always "immediately precedes volition," and that it "deter-
mines the will."33 This means that it immediately determines the will.
There is no reason to believe that Locke is contradicting himself, however.
All that needs to be done, since he suggests as much, is to assume that
both together immediately determine the will, but in two different senses
of "determine." The assumption comes down to this: on the one side, an
uneasiness connected to a desire of an absent good immediately deter-
mines a volition in the sense that the uneasiness directly motivates one to
will (to perform some action in order to attain the desired good). On the
other side, a last judgement immediately determines a volition in the sense
that it directly determines which sort of action one is to will in order to
pursue the desired good hie et nunc. The two factors are inseparable: with-
out an uneasiness, one would not be motivated to will; without a last
judgement, whether rash or well considered, one would not know what
sort of action to will. Both together cause the volition.
In sum, the power of the understanding to determine a volition is both
mediate and immediate, in two different respects. The exercise of the
understanding in deliberation can only mediately motivate a volition; this
is done by producing or heightening an uneasiness connected to a desire
of some absent good. The exercise of the understanding, by way of a last
judgement (whether the result of deliberation or not), immediately deter-
mines a volition by fixing the sort of action to be willed hie et nunc.
4. The Suspension of Desire and What Is Improperly Called Free Will
The theory of suspension of desire is the second important addition Locke
makes to the second edition. The connection between this theory and that
of uneasiness is straightforward, provided one has in mind the central role
of the understanding and its free operation. Suppose one simultaneously
has several uneasinesses caused by ideas of different absent goods, and
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that one wishes to attentively examine these ideas and to deliberate before
acting. If one of the more powerful uneasinesses determined one to will to
act before the process of deliberation were completed, the whole point of
the process would be defeated since one would not be acting according to
the result of one's deliberation. Therefore, as long as the process of delib-
eration is going on the agent must have some power to momentarily pre-
vent her present uneasinesses from causing a volition to act. Such a power,
of course, is limited; some uneasinesses may be overwhelming, but without
it the very attempt to examine one's ideas of absent goods and to deliber-
ate would be pointless. This is why Locke repeats that it is not inevitably
the case that the most powerful uneasiness that one has at a certain
moment determines the will; it does so only "ordinarily," "for the most
part," that is, when one does not suspend one's desires in order to deliber-
ate, whatever the reason for not deliberating may be.34
[I]t is natural... that the greatest, and most pressing [uneasiness] should deter-
mine the will to the next action; and so it does for the most part, but not always.
For the mind having in most cases, as is evident in Experience, a power to sus-
pend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all, one after
another, is at liberty to consider the objects of them; examine them on all sides,
and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty Man has; and from not using
it r ight . . . we precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too soon
before due Examination. To prevent this we have a power to suspend the prose-
cution of this or that desire, as every one daily may Experiment in himself. This
seems to me the source of all liberty; in this seems to consist that, which is (as
I think improperly) call'd Free will. (§47)
Clearly, Locke refuses to call the kind of freedom discussed here "free
will," although he acknowledges that others improperly call it so. And one
can well understand why he refuses. For what the power to suspend one's
desires enables is the effective use of one's power to freely deliberate.
Locke's point is that it is freedom to think, not freedom to will, that is
enabled by the suspension of desire. Also, a close reading of the passage
will detect a subtle distinction between, on the one hand, what liberty "lies
in," i.e., consists in, and, on the other hand, "the source of all liberty."
What the liberty under consideration "lies in" is freedom to deliberate, the
"liberty to consider the objects of them; examine them on all sides, and
weigh them with others." However, the "source" of liberty is the power of
suspension. And Locke says that it is the power of suspension that is
improperly called "free will" by others: "the source of all liberty; in this
seems to consist that, which is (as I think improperly) call'd Free will."*5
Why is the power of suspension, according to Locke, the "source" of lib-
erty? Because, in optimal circumstances, suspension is what enables delib-
eration to be carried out until a careful last judgement determines one to
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will to act. But the "source" of the free exercise of the power of thought and
deliberation is not identical to the free exercise itself. In another passage,
Locke calls the power of suspension "the hinge on which turns the liberty
of intellectual Beings in their constant endeavours after . . . true felicity"
(§52). But again, one cannot just identify "the hinge" with the liberty that
"turns" on it. And the fact that the liberty in question is that of "intellectual
Beings" clearly suggests that the liberty under discussion is that of thought
in deliberation, which is distinct from the power of suspension.
However, in another passage Locke combines the two together, saying:
"The first therefore and great use of Liberty, is to hinder blind Precipi-
tancy; the principal exercise of Freedom is to stand still, open the eyes,
look about, and take a view of the consequence of what we are going to
do, as much as the weight of the matter requires" (§67). It is slightly inac-
curate to say, as Ayers does, that in this passage Locke suggests that the
power of suspension "really constitutes the liberty of rational agents."36
True, "to stand still" is to suspend one's desires, as Locke explains else-
where.37 But "to open the eyes, look about, and take a view of the conse-
quence of what we are going to do" is an exercise of the power of thinking.
In this passage "the principal exercise of freedom" includes both suspen-
sion and deliberative thinking. The same appears in §52, where suspen-
sion is called both the "inlet" and the "exercise" of liberty.38
In sum, Locke wavers between two positions. Sometimes, suspension of
desire is presented as no more than an important necessary condition of
freedom to think in deliberation; it is a "source," a "hinge," an "inlet," on
which the latter depends, but is distinct from the latter. At other times, as
in §67, it is assimilated to freedom of deliberation, presumably for the fol-
lowing reasons: (1) it is such an important necessary condition that it can
be considered a part of a whole continuous process, the other part of the
process being deliberation; the entire process, comprising both suspension
and deliberation, is condensed in the phrase "to stand still, open the eyes,
look about, and take a view of the consequence of what we are going to do";
(2) the act of suspending one's desires and the process of deliberation are
performed for exactly the same reason in the long run; both aim at the same
goal; (3) the duration of suspension is roughly the same as that of deliber-
ation. (A fourth reason will be provided below.) Although these reasons
suffice to explain why Locke sometimes brings together the power of sus-
pension and the power to deliberate, this should not obscure the fact that,
strictly speaking, the momentary suspension of one's desires is no more
than a necessary condition of the exercise of one's freedom to deliberate.
At this point two questions arise: (1) Is the act of suspension ever vol-
untary? (2) Can it sometimes be performed freely? It must be possible for
us to suspend our desires freely in some cases at least, for Locke considers
deliberation to be a moral obligation, a duty.39 And if it can be done freely
in some cases, it can be done voluntarily. Remember that "Assent, Sus-
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pense, or Dissent, are often voluntary Actions." Therefore, as to the first
question, Locke would be willing to grant that suspension is sometimes
caused by a volition, itself caused by an uneasiness, presumably the kind
of uneasiness caused by conscious doubt as when "we are not sufficiently
assured of the way" (§50). Ayers sees a problem here, asking: "If reason
cannot directly move to action, how can it directly move to delibera-
tion?"40 But if the reading proposed so far is correct, there is no reason to
believe that reason directly moves to deliberation. The relation between
reason and deliberation is only indirect. Presumably, a certain epistemic
state of "reason," i.e., doubt—along with the idea of an absent good (such
as acting in a more enlightened way)—produces an uneasiness, and this
is what directly motivates one to will to suspend one's desires and to delib-
erate.
If Locke accepts freedom to suspend one's desires, as I have suggested,
all that is required is that he grant two rather uncontroversial points. First,
we are to count among actions not only bodily movements and acts of
thinking, but also acts of suspending desire. And, secondly, in some cir-
cumstances it is within one's power either to voluntarily suspend one's
desires or to refrain from doing so, without restraint nor compulsion. If
this interpretation is correct, we are still dealing with the same old model
of freedom to act as one wills: the "Indifferency of Ability on either side
to act." The only thing that the suggested reading requires is that we
extend this indifferency, with due empirical limitations, to the power to
suspend one's desires. In doing so, we do not depart from Locke's basic
conception of freedom to act. If one accepts this reading, one has a fur-
ther (fourth) reason for which Locke tends at times to assimilate suspen-
sion with deliberation: in certain circumstances both can be exercised
freely. Finally, if, as this reading suggests, freely suspending one's desires
is similar—in the ways mentioned—to freely producing a bodily move-
ment as one wills, and to freely thinking of this or that idea as one wills,
then it, too, is compatible with causal determinism.
We have seen that, according to Locke (§47), what some of his oppo-
nents improperly call "free will" is no more than the free exercise of the
power of suspension in order to deliberate. And it should now be clear
why this is not free will: freedom to suspend one's desires is freedom to
act in a certain way as one wills, not freedom to will. This is why it is
important not to confuse freedom to suspend one's desires, with a pur-
ported freedom to will to suspend one's desires. I now turn to Locke's
rejection of free will, and to his eventual acceptance, in the fifth edition,
of a certain sort of freedom in respect of willing. (This will not be freedom
to will to suspend one's desires.) The next section addresses whether
Locke's tardy acceptance of a freedom in respect of willing is consistent
with his denial of free will, and how both issues bear on what is "improp-
erly called free will," the power to freely suspend one's desires.
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5. Freedom in Respect of Willing vs. Free Will
Locke has three arguments (in §§14-17, 23-24, and 25) purporting to show
that free will is impossible. Because Chappell has well analyzed them, I
hereafter refer the reader to Chappell's reconstructions.41 I shall only
briefly summarize the main points of each argument. However, Chappell
also critically assesses the relation of the arguments to Locke's evolving,
global position in II, 21, and I disagree with some of his interpretations,
so I shall take a stand on a few of Chappell's objections, in the hope of
gradually sketching out a picture of Locke's position on freedom in
respect of willing that is perhaps more consistent than may otherwise
appear. At the end of this section, I return to the issue of freedom to sus-
pend one's desires, improperly called "free will."
The first reason for which Locke denies freedom of the will is that the
will is one active power, freedom is another active power, and one power
cannot belong to another. Powers necessarily belong to agents and to
agents alone. Thus, it is a category mistake to say that the will is free.
The point is well taken. But a friend of free will could rephrase her posi-
tion so as to avoid the category mistake. One could say, for instance, that
just as an agent is sometimes free to act (with respect to bodily movement,
to suspension, or to thinking), she is also sometimes free to will. Locke fore-
sees the objection and proceeds to block it with a second argument, pur-
porting to show that "a Man in respect of willing, or the Act of Volition, when
any Action in his power is once proposed to his Thoughts, as presently to be
done, cannot be free" (§23). The conclusion is that in any circumstances
where one considers an action "as presently to be done," it is necessarily the
case either that one wills the action to be done or that one wills it not to be
done. Chappell calls this the "unavoidability thesis" and points out, cor-
rectly, that it "ascribes necessity de dicto to a proposition about agents.. ..
It says that if an agent thinks about doing something x, then it is necessary
that either he will to do x or else he will not to do x." This must be distin-
guished from the thesis of volitional determinism, which "applies to con-
crete acts of willing, and . . . ascribes necessity de re to all of them." The two
theses are logically distinct.42 The volitional determinism thesis is not part
of the argument of §23, whereas the unavoidability thesis is. In a nutshell,
when an agent considers an action "as presently to be done," she is not free
to will or not to will because it is necessarily the case either that she wills the
action to be done or that she wills it not to be done. In either case, she wills.
Let us make two remarks about this argument. First, Chappell says, fol-
lowing Leibniz, that the unavoidability thesis rests on a false premise: "if
the man considering such an action did not will it not to exist, it would not
not exist." The premise seems wrong to Chappell because he thinks that it
is contradicted by the fact that one can suspend one's desires in order to
deliberate; in such a case, during deliberation, one does not perform the
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action under consideration, yet this is not because one wills it not to exist.
Still worse, according to Chappell the erroneous premise makes Locke's
position contradictory, because he himself claims that we have the power
to suspend our desires.43 However, Chappell's reading seems to me to be
excessively uncharitable. Why? Locke explicitly restricts the scope of his
argument to cases where the action under consideration is "once proposed
to his Thoughts, as presently to be done," i.e., right away. Locke is surely
using "once" not to mean "as soon as," but as shorthand for "as soon as
and so long as." For instance, we often say things such as: "Once the ship
is under way we shall arrive at Cobh in four hours." In such a context
"once" is taken to mean "as soon as and so long as," for it goes without
saying that we shall not arrive at Cobh in four hours as soon as the ship is
under way, if the engines happen to break down en route. What Locke
surely means is that as soon as and so long as an action is proposed to one's
thought as presently to be done, i.e., right away, if one considering such an
action did not will it not to exist, it would not not exist. Notice that it is
not obvious that this claim is mistaken; if it is, it is not for the reason given
by Chappell, for consider the following alternative: either suspension of
desire is done voluntarily or it is done involuntarily. If it is done voluntar-
ily, Locke could reply to Chappell that by suspending his desires in order
to deliberate, the agent postpones both willing the action to exist and will-
ing it not to exist. In which case, because the action appears to the agent
as one that can be postponed until the process of deliberation is com-
pleted, the action is not "proposed to his Thoughts, as presently to be
done," i.e., right away. If, on the contrary, the suspension of desire is invol-
untary, perhaps when one's attention is suddenly diverted and captivated
by intruding ideas, then the "so long as" clause is not respected. If the
agent is suddenly distracted by intruding thoughts, it is no longer the case
that the action initially considered remains "proposed to his thoughts."44
Second, even if Locke can be defended in the way suggested, this does
nothing to remove another apparent difficulty. The unavoidability thesis
is taken by Locke, in §23, to apply specifically to acts of the will. But notice
that, at first glance, nothing seems to prevent it from applying to free
bodily actions as well. To elaborate on one of Locke's examples, suppose
a person in a room with an open door freely remains there. Her remaining
in the room freely is due to the "Indifferency of Ability on either side to
act": she could go out if she so willed. Yet, it seems that the unavoidability
thesis applies to her situation, for it seems necessary that either the person
remain in the room or that she leave it. In other words, the unavoidability
thesis thus applied seems compatible with the indifferency essential to
freedom of action. If so, why is it supposed to rule out freedom to will?
Presumably, Locke's reply to the objection would go along the following
lines. Both willing an action to exist and willing an action not to exist are
ways, or modes, of willing, just as leaving a room or staying in it are ways,
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or modes, of situating one's body in relation to a room: inside of it or out-
side of it. Just as one is not free (once and so long as one considers an
action as presently to be done) to refrain from some act of willing (either
one wills the action to exist or one wills it not to exist), just so, if one is in
a room, one is not free to refrain from situating one's body in relation to
the room (either one remains in it or one leaves it). Thus, the necessity of
willing captured by the unavoidability thesis is similar to the necessity of
thinking, and to the necessity of having one's body touch another. While
awake, a person "is not at liberty to think, or not to think; no more than
he is at liberty, whether his Body shall touch any other or no"—for a "wak-
ing Man" is "under the necessity of having some Ideas constantly in his
Mind," and, awake or not, of having his body touch at least some other
physical object (§12). Similarly, so long as an action is proposed to one's
thoughts as presently to be done, one is not at liberty to will or not to will.
But this reply will prompt two rejoinders from Locke's adversaries. The
first is this. The argument based on the unavoidability thesis, as the argu-
ment is phrased, attains its conclusion only if restricted to situations
where suspension of desire does not enter the picture. The conclusion is
not universal in scope, applying only to a certain class of actions, so how
does the unavoidability thesis fare once suspension of desire is taken into
account? Let us postpone an answer to this question for a bit. The second
rejoinder is this. The real question concerning free will is independent of
the unavoidability thesis insofar as an advocate of free will could grant the
unavoidability thesis, and yet assert that an agent is free, in certain cir-
cumstances, either to will a certain action to exist or to will it not to exist.
Just as, according to Locke himself, one is free in certain circumstances
to think of this idea rather than that (although one is not free to think or
not to think), and just as one is free in certain circumstances to have one's
body touch this physical object rather than that (although one is not free
to have one's body touch something or not), just so it seems that one
should be free, in certain circumstances, to will an action to exist or to will
the action not to exist (although one is not free to will or not to will).
Let us begin with the second question. Locke seems to have foreseen it,
for he tries to answer it in his third argument against freedom to will (§25).
The conclusion to be reached is a negative reply to the question, " Whether
a Man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases, Motion or Rest."
The argument is by all standards extremely elliptical, and all the more dif-
ficult to interpret in detail. Again, we follow Chappell's reconstruction.45
Locke believes that if it were possible to be free to will an action to exist
or to will it not to exist, i.e., to will some contrary action to exist instead,
then one would be involved in an infinite regress: one would have to "sup-
pose one Will to determine the Acts of another, and another to determi-
nate that; and so on in infinitum" (§25). It seems that Locke is relying here
on the thesis according to which a free action is voluntary by definition;
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i.e., it is caused by a volition, so that, if one willed motion freely (i.e., in
circumstances in which one could also will rest), the volition to move
would itself have to be caused by an antecedent volition. But this is not
all, for the second volition could only belong to another will ("one Will
to determine the Acts of another"). Not only would there be two volitions,
but each volition would belong to a different will, as if an agent could have
more than one power of willing! This is why one should accept as an
implicit premise what Chappell calls the "heteronomy principle": "no will
determines itself, i.e., determines the acts of willing which belongs to it."
But why should there be an infinite regress? Why not just stop at a second
volition, belonging to a second will? Because of another implicit premise,
which Chappell calls "the inheritance principle": "an agent is free with
respect to an act, only if he also is free with respect to the act of willing
which produces that act." This is what brings it about that the second voli-
tion should itself be caused by a third, and so on, with as many different
wills at each stage. Obviously, Locke does not accept the inheritance prin-
ciple, since he holds that free actions, such as some bodily movements and
thoughts, are causally determined by volitions that are not exercised
freely. This is why the argument of §25 must be construed as ad hominem;
it is not Locke, but his opponents, who hold the inheritance principle.
However, Chappell considers it extremely unlikely that it is an ad hom-
inem argument, because Locke's opponents would not have accepted the
heteronomy principle, to which Locke is committed.46 But this objection to
an ad hominem construal of the argument of §25 seems unconvincing.
Locke may have any number of reasons for believing that his opponents
just do not have the right to deny the heteronomy principle. Which reasons?
No one can be sure. But here is a suggestion. If a will had the power to
determine itself, one of its exercises would be a volition to produce a voli-
tion. And Locke may well consider this psychologically impossible. For it
is not at all obvious what a volition to produce a volition could be, given
that a volition immediately causes and accompanies an "exerting," an
"endeavouring," or trying to do something. For instance, what could it be
to will to will to tie one's shoelaces, to take a bath, or even to stop smoking?
Of course, second-order desires are perfectly in order, as are desires to will;
and so are evaluative approvals of one's volition. One can desire to desire a
certain good; one can desire to will and to endeavour to do something; and
one can approve of one's volition to do something. But we have seen that
desire and volition are quite distinct in Locke. Keeping this in mind, it is
just not obvious that there are any willings to will to do something; there
may only be first-order volitions to act.47 If so, then, although a volition is
an act of the mind, and although one may wholeheartedly approve of one's
present volition, a volition is just not the sort of act that can be performed
voluntarily, at least if an act is voluntary if, and only if, it is directly caused
by one's volition to perform it. A second reason for believing that Locke
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would deny the existence of volitions to will is that he holds, we have seen,
that every volition is immediately caused by an uneasiness and a last judge-
ment. If so, then no volition can be immediately caused by a prior volition,
that is to say, there are no willings to will and one cannot will as one wills.
Thus, we have a quite plausible reason for which Locke would deny his
opponents the right to reject the heteronomy principle. Indeed, there is fur-
ther reason to attribute this view to Locke, because it is a good interpreta-
tion of what he is getting at in §25 when he says with scathing irony: "to ask,
whether a Man be at liberty to will either Motion, or Rest. . . ; which he
pleases, is to ask, whether a Man can will, what he wills; or be pleased with
what he is pleased with. A Question, which, I think, needs no answer," the
answer being obviously negative.48 Locke's point here seems to be that voli-
tions are always necessary (non-free) because they cannot be performed
voluntarily (at least in the sense mentioned above). Therefore, pace Chap-
pell, the argument of §25 can, and should, be taken as ad hominem.
A significant feature of the three arguments against free will is that
none of them purport to show that volitions are not free merely because
they are causally determined. Indeed, if that were a sufficient reason to
reject freedom to will, the same reason would cancel freedom of bodily
action, freedom of thinking, and freedom of suspension. The fact that
Locke does not argue that free will is impossible merely because volitions
are causally determined highlights his compatibilism.
Let us return now to a question mentioned above. The argument based
on the unavoidability thesis (§23), as the argument is phrased, attains its
conclusion only if restricted to situations where one does not suspend
one's desires. So how does the unavoidability thesis fare once suspension
of desire occurs? Locke adds a passage in the fifth edition to the effect
that, in cases where one does suspend one's desires, the unavoidability the-
sis does not apply. And because it does not apply to such cases, Locke con-
cedes that there is, after all, some sort of "liberty in respect of willing."
[I]n most cases a Man is not at Liberty to forbear the act of volition; he must
exert an act of his will, whereby the action proposed, is made to exist, or not to
exist. But yet there is a case wherein a Man is at Liberty in respect of willing,
and that is the chusing of a remote Good as an end to be pursued. Here a Man
may suspend the act of his choice from being determined for or against the thing
proposed, till he has examined, whether it be really of a nature in it self and con-
sequences to make him happy, or no. For when he has once chosen it, and
thereby it is become a part of his Happiness, it raises desire, and that propor-
tionably gives him uneasiness, which determines his will, and sets him at work
in pursuit of his choice on all occasions that offer. (§56)
Clearly, Locke has changed his mind regarding freedom to will. But it is
important to stress that his change of mind is not an acceptance of free
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will as he understands, and rejects, the notion. Let us clarify this by
answering two questions. (1) What exactly is the "liberty in respect of will-
ing" that appears in the fifth edition? (2) Why is it not free will ? What
seems clear enough is that the kind of "liberty in respect of willing" that
Locke has in mind in §56 obtains only in the context of suspension and
deliberation. So, presumably it can be understood in the following way.
Suppose an agent has several desires and uneasinesses, one of which is an
uneasiness that, being the strongest, would normally cause a volition
(which we shall call "volition-1") to do A. On the one hand, if the agent
does not suspend her desires in order to deliberate on whether to do A or
not, then ceteris paribus the strongest uneasiness (along with a hasty last
judgement) will produce volition-1 to do A. On the other hand, if the agent
decides to suspend her desires in order to deliberate, she produces a volition
(which we shall call "volition-3") that causes a suspension-deliberation
process. If this occurs, then either (1) the result of her deliberation con-
firms as appropriate the initial desire cum uneasiness, in which case voli-
tion-1 to do A is produced after all,49 or (2) it disconfirms the initial desire
and raises instead another desire cum uneasiness, which (together with a
last judgement) produces a volition (which we shall call "volition-2") to
refrain from doing A (to do B instead). Let us pursue the hypothesis under
which the agent decides to deliberate. During the process of suspension
and deliberation neither volition-1 nor volition-2 is produced. Hence, as
long as suspension and deliberation are under way, as regards the pair of
alternatives volition-1 and volition-2, it is not the case that, necessarily,
either the one or the other is produced. Because of volition-3, the agent is
able voluntarily "to forbear the act of volition"; it is not the case that "he
must exert an act of his will, whereby the action proposed is made to exist,
or not to exist." During the process, the unavoidability thesis does not
apply to the pair of alternatives volition-1 and volition-2. Because it does
not apply, we have "liberty in respect of willing."
But what is this freedom? Let us first see what it is not. It cannot consist
in an indifferency of the will, during suspension and deliberation, by
which an agent could will to produce either volition-1 or volition-2, since
this is ruled out by the heteronomy principle ("no will determines itself,
i.e., determines the acts of willing which belong to it"), an implicit premise
of the argument of §25 that Chappell correctly attributes to Locke. And
one could not describe the situation during deliberation by saying that the
agent is able either to will to do A (to produce volition-1) or to will to do
B (to produce volition-2) as she wills, for that would suppose that one can
will to will, and we have seen that Locke would object to that. Hence, the
fact that the unavoidability thesis does not hold during suspension and
deliberation does not imply—indeed, according to Locke, cannot imply—
an "Indifferency of [the will] on either side to act" in regard to volition-1
and volition-2.
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In order to have a volition one must be motivated to will the production
of a specific action. The motivation is furnished by an uneasiness, the sort
of action by a last judgement.50 During deliberation, that is, before an
uneasiness is de-suspended and before a last judgement is made, one is not
able to will, so it is pointless, Locke believes, to wonder whether one is free
to will this or to will that, since one is not able to will at all. This is how
we should read a letter of 1701 to van Limborch, in which Locke makes
it clear that he would not accept an indifferency of the will by which a per-
son could produce either volition-1 or volition-2:
Moreover to argue as to whether a man, before the last judgement of the under-
standing, has liberty to determine himself to one or other of opposites seems to
me to be arguing about nothing at all or about an impossibility. For who would
ask, or what does it avail to ask, whether a man can determine himself to one
or other of opposites when he is in a state in which he is unable to determine
himself? For before the judgement of the understanding he is altogether unable
to determine himself, and so it is idle to inquire whether in that state he has lib-
erty to determine himself to one or other alternative when he is altogether
unable to determine himself to either.51
I mentioned before that Locke does not say that free will is impossible
merely because volitions are causally determined. What is implied by this
passage, taken together with what we have previously seen, is that free will
is impossible because of the kind of determination required for one to have
a volition at all. If per impossibile a volition were not determined by an
uneasiness and a last judgement, it would not be motivated and it would
not be directed towards a certain sort of action, which is absurd given
what a volition is.
For the foregoing reasons "liberty in respect of willing" is not free will
as Locke understands, and rejects, the notion. (Another reason is that the
mere expression "free will" contains the category mistake of ascribing one
power, freedom, to another, the will.) But what, then, is it? It can only be
the power to initiate a suspension-deliberation process or to refrain from
doing so, as one wills. This is coherent with §56, and also with §47 quoted
above. It also fits an important passage of another letter, of 1702, to van
Limborch, where Locke says,
[Y]ou appear to doubt whether I hold that a man is free in Willing or in Under-
standing . . . ; you also ask whether the action of willing or understanding is
free. To this question I answer thus:
1. Generally, indeed, that in my opinion a man is free in every action, as well
of willing as of understanding, if he was able to have abstained from that
action of willing or understanding; if not, not.
2. More particularly, as regards the will: there are some cases in which a man
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is unable not to will, and in all those acts of willing a man is not free because
he is unable not to act. In the rest, where he was able to will or not to will,
he is free.52
This may look like an endorsement of free will, but it is not. Let us focus
on paragraph number two. Our foregoing discussion shows that there are
two cases wherein "a man is unable not to will." One case is where, con-
cerning an action "once proposed to [one's] thoughts, as presently to be
done," the agent cannot avoid willing one way or the other (restricted
unavoidability thesis).53 Another case is where suspension of desire is not
possible, perhaps due to an overwhelming uneasiness demanding imme-
diate action. As to the agent's being "able to will or not to will," this per-
tains to cases where the agent finds herself in a situation in which she can
either suspend her desires, or not, in order to deliberate. Now, if she is able
to suspend them she is able "not to will" for a certain period of time; that
is, she can initiate a process whereby she brings it about that, during the
process, she neither wills to do A nor wills to do B (she produces neither
volition-1 nor volition-2). And, if she is able to refrain from suspending
her desires, she is "able to will"; that is, she is able to bring it about that
she wills to A without deliberating (she produces volition-1). Now, it is
important to note that one's being "able to will or not to will," so con-
strued, is not free will as Locke understands it. It does not commit Locke
to rejecting the heteronomy principle, nor to accepting volitions of voli-
tions. In particular, the volition to initiate a suspension-deliberation pro-
cess (volition-3) is not a volition that directly causes one to refrain from
producing either volition-1 or volition-2; it is a volition to bring about a
process, knowing that the process, as long as it lasts, will temporarily
make it causally impossible for oneself to produce either volition-1 or
volition-2. And the volition to refrain from initiating a suspension-desire
process is not a volition that directly causes volition-1; it is a volition to
refrain from preventing some strong desire cum uneasiness to cause voli-
tion-1. In neither case does the agent will to will.
This is voluntary control of one's will, but the control is at a temporal
and causal distance; it is only mediate, indirect. It is a voluntary control
of what will causally determine one's will in the future. Chappell holds
that the "liberty in respect of willing" of §56 implies that Locke abandons
what Chappell calls "volitional determinism."54 This seems to be mis-
taken. Locke's "liberty in respect of willing" is compatible with the neces-
sity (non-freedom) of all volitions, for it is compatible with the claim that
no volitions are free because no volitions are performed voluntarily (in
the sense discussed above concerning §25). Furthermore, "liberty in
respect of willing" is entirely compatible with causal determinism, for, to
return to our preceding example, whichever of the two volitions (volition-
1 or volition-2) the agent eventually has, either one will be causally deter-
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mined. Locke's position only requires him to endorse the harmless point
that different causal chains can lead to type-identical volitions (volition-
1 as produced after deliberation and volition-1 as produced without
deliberation, although type-identical, are not token-identical, since they
would have different causes). And surely, too, the volition to initiate a sus-
pension-deliberation process (volition-3) is itself causally determined, as
would be the contrary volition if it occurred. The freedom in question is
that of a person to initiate, or to refrain from initiating, a suspension-
deliberation process, as she wills. It is not that of a person to will to initiate
the process, or to will to refrain from doing so. The latter would be incon-
sistent with Locke's rejection of free will.
This interpretation of the ability "to will or not to will" discussed in
Locke's letter of 1702 to van Limborch fits in nicely, I believe, with §47 and
§56 quoted above. In §47 the sort of freedom that Locke points to is that
of thought and deliberation. We have seen that, for several reasons, Locke
assimilates freedom to suspend one's desires with freedom to deliberate as
two parts, or aspects, of a process. The assimilation continues in §56 and
in the letter of 1702 to van Limborch. Because of this, the "liberty in
respect of willing" of §56 can be roughly identified with what Locke says,
in §47, is "improperly called free will," and with the ability "to will or not
to will" of the letter. It is the limited freedom to initiate a suspension-
deliberation-process, or to refrain from doing so, as one wills. It is a power
to act as one wills, not to will as one wills. Confirmation for this interpre-
tation can be drawn from van Limborch himself, who understands Locke
precisely this way:
You then deduce thence that the liberty of a man consists in this: that he can sus-
pend the fulfilment of any of his desires and has complete liberty to consider them
one after another, to examine their objects, to observe them from every side, and
to compare them one with another, before he determines himself to acting.55
6. Concluding Remarks
Throughout II, 21 and his correspondence with van Limborch, Locke
keeps a firm grasp on one, and only one, general conception of the power
of freedom: the power to act as one wills. This conception applies (with
due limitations) to bodily action, thought (deliberation), and suspension.
Of course, volitions are acts, too. But, according to Locke, the same con-
ception of freedom is inapplicable to acts of willing; one cannot will to
will, and so one cannot will as one wills. His recognition of a "liberty in
respect of willing," an ability "to will or not to will," is consistent both
with causal determinism and with his denial of free will.
True, his three arguments against free will are hardly convincing. The
category-mistake argument can be blocked by a friend of free will merely by
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rephrasing her position. The argument based on the unavoidability thesis is
not universal in scope; it applies only to a certain class of actions. And the
regressus argument is ad hominem; it can be resisted by the homo denying
one of the premises attributed to him. Nevertheless, one can understand a
deeper and more interesting motive for Locke's rejection of free will by keep-
ing in mind that, for him, a volition not immediately caused by an uneasi-
ness and a last judgement would be an absurdity: it would be unmotivated
and it would not be directed towards a certain sort of act. This is what rules
out the possibility of willing to will, and thus of willing as one wills, for if
one could will to will, then one's volition would not be immediately caused
by an uneasiness and a last judgement, but by a prior volition.
The successive alterations made by Locke from the second to the fifth
edition of the Essay concerning uneasiness, suspension, and freedom in
respect of willing are part and parcel of an evolving theory of freedom of
thinking. All three are theoretically motivated by Locke's gradual recog-
nition that freedom of thinking must be granted a more prominent role
within his moral psychology than it was afforded in the first edition. And
this, in turn, is motivated by Locke's recognition of the importance of
weakness of the will. Yet, the three changes are not revolutions in Locke's
position on human freedom taken as a whole. They are substantial adjust-
ments made to accommodate an increasingly deeper and broader concep-
tion of what was present from the very outset, in the first edition: the free
power of thinking.56
Notes
1 Textual alterations were made in the second (1694) and fourth (1700) editions,
and prepared for the fifth (1706), which was to be posthumous. The single
greatest textual revision concerns §§28-38 of the first edition, which were
replaced by §§28-60 in the second. Parts of the original eleven sections sur-
vived, however, and were variously relocated in the second edition.
2 Locke 1975, p. 11. Unless otherwise indicated, all future references to the
Essay are to II, 21.
3 Cf. Chappell 1994, pp. 118-19. The recurrence of Chappell's name in this paper
is a measure of what I owe his excellent essay.
4 Chappell locates Locke's assertion of what the former—not Locke—calls "voli-
tional determinism" in §25, and explains it in the following way: "Volitional
determinism applies to concrete acts of willing, and it ascribes necessity de re
to all of them. It says of every volition that it is a necessary action on the part
of its agent" (Chappell 1994, p. 107; cf. p. 101). Chappell's explanation is not
without its difficulties. The noun "necessity" seems to be used in a modal sense,
whereas the adjective "necessary" seems to be used as Locke usually employs
it in II, 21, namely, as a synonym for "non-free." Next, it is not clear whether
or not Chappell thinks that, according to Locke, (p) volitions are necessary
(non-free) actions because they are causally determined. Chappell does not
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attribute (p) to Locke in so many words. Yet, if this is not what he means, why
does he call the position he does attribute to Locke in §25 "volitional determin-
ism"! True, he says that "no action is necessary for Locke simply by being the
effect of antecedent causes" (p. 104), but the context does not indicate that
Chappell here includes volitions among actions. Therefore, in doubt as to
whether Chappell attributes (p) to Locke or not, I will give independent reasons
for two distinct claims: (1) for the claim that Locke's late acceptance of "Lib-
erty in respect of willing" does not contradict, and does not lead him to aban-
don, the thesis that all volitions are non-free (that is, the thesis that free will is
impossible); and (2) for the claim that his acceptance of "Liberty in respect of
willing" does not contradict, and does not lead him to abandon, the thesis that
all volitions are causally determined. If Chappell does not attribute (p) to
Locke, then my argument in favour of claim (2) is no objection against him.
5 Cf. Locke 1975, II, 27, §§9 and 26.
6 Cf., for example, II, 21, §§6 and 16-20.
7 "For... there being but two sorts of Action, whereof we have any Idea, viz. Think-
ing and Motion . . . " (§4); "All the Actions that we have any Idea of, reducing
themselves, as has been said, to these two, viz. Thinking and Motion . . ." (§8).
8 II, 21, §5.1 agree with Lowe that in Locke an action (a bodily movement or a
thought) is voluntary if, and only if, it is directly caused by a volition (cf. Lowe
1986). Lowe's reading has been criticized by Yaffe (cf. Yaffe 2000, pp. 104ff.).
Although Yaffe agrees that causation by a volition is necessary for an action
to be voluntary, he does not think that Locke holds that it is sufficient. Instead,
Yaffe proposes the following: "A proper action A of an agent S is voluntary if
and only if it satisfies a volition to do A on the part of S" (p. 109), keeping in
mind that "it is a necessary condition of a volition's satisfaction that it causes
the action that it is aimed at" (p. 110). A proper discussion of Yaffe's appealing
position would exceed the space I have. Let me make only two points. Firstly,
Locke's sentence ("The forbearance or performance of that action, conse-
quent to such order or command of the mind is called Voluntary") should be
taken within its context at face value. It means that "the forbearance or per-
formance" of an action is called "voluntary" when it is caused by "such order
or command." And why should it be called "voluntary" when it is caused by
a volition, unless being so caused is a sufficient condition for its being volun-
tary? Secondly, in my view Yaffe's interesting defence, theoretical argument
cum textual evidence, of his interpretation does not support the claim that
Locke held the position he ascribes to him. It lends support to the claim that,
if Locke had discussed with present-day philosophers of action, and been led
by them to think seriously about deviant causal chains and conditions of sat-
isfaction of intentional states, he might have accepted Yaffe's suggestion.
9 According to Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, 1992 (p. 499),
"endeavo[u]r" and "attempt" are synonyms of "exertion."
10 Locke 1982, p. 327.
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11 Locke does not explicitly distinguish between involuntary and non-voluntary
actions. He seems to classify both under the heading "involuntary," as when
he says that "whatsoever action is performed without such a thought of the
mind [a volition] is called Involuntary" (II, 21, §5).
12 Cf. Chappell 1994, p. 104. On Locke as a compatibilist, cf. Yaffe 2000, n.5.
13 "Liberty is for me the power of a man to act or not to act, according to his
will: that is to say, if a man is able to do this if he wills to do it, and on the other
hand to abstain from doing this when he wills to abstain from doing it: in that
case a man is free" (Locke 1982, p. 406, my italics).
14 "For wherever restraint comes to check that Power, or compulsion takes away
that Indifferency of Ability on either side to act, or to forbear acting, there
liberty, and our Notion of it, presently ceases" (§10); "This [Necessity] in an
Agent capable of Volition, when the beginning or continuation of any Action
is contrary to that preference of his Mind, is called Compulsion; when the
hind'ring or stopping any Action is contrary to his Volition, it is called
Restraint" (§13).
15 Cf. §§8-11.
16 Cf. the example Locke discusses in §71.
17 Cf. Locke 1982, p. 407, and Locke 1975, II, 21, §71.
18 Locke 1982, p. 681. "For the most part a man is able not to open his eyes or
not to turn his gaze to this or that object, but when his eyes are opened and
turned to the sun or moon he necessarily sees the brightness and the shape that
present themselves to his observation. What I have said of the eyes may be
transferred to the understanding: the principle is the same for both" (p. 681).
Cf. IV, 20, §16.
19 Locke 1982, pp. 680-681.
20 II, 14, §15; cf. II, 7 §3.
21 Locke 1982, p. 411: "every single volition is always preceded by some judge-
ment of the understanding about the thing to be done, and . . . that judgement
that immediately precedes the volition or act of willing is in that case the last
judgement of the understanding."
22 "I think, a Man, who has weighed them [proofs] can scarce refuse his Assent
to the side, on which the greater Probability appears" (IV, 20, §15); "it is not
in our Choice, to take which side we please, if manifest odds appear on either.
The greater Probability, I think, in that Case, will determine the Assent: and
a Man can no more avoid assenting, or taking it to be true, where he perceives
the greater Probability, than he can avoid knowing it to be true, where he per-
ceives the Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas" (IV, 20, §16).
23 Cf. n.21 above.
24 I thank an anonymous referee for help with this point.
25 All of the preceding quotations are from Locke 1982, pp. 410-11. Much of the
same doctrine is to be found in the Essay, II, 21, although not stated as explic-
itly as in the letter quoted above. In §47 Locke speaks of "the last result of a
fair Examination," which can only be the last judgement of deliberation. In §48
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he speaks of the "last judgment of the Good or Evil, that is thought to attend
its Choice," and makes clear a few lines further that the judgement concerns
action: "the last result of our own Minds, judging of the good or evil of any
action." And in §52 he says that "the last determination of the Judgment" can
be either "upon an hasty and precipitate view, or upon a due and mature
Examination."
26 Essay, first-edition text at bottom of pp. 253-54.
27 Locke 1975, II, 21, §33. Bennett rightly notes that Locke is uncertain whether
uneasiness is identical with desire, is a cause of desire, or is an effect of desire;
Locke vacillates between the three possibilities (cf. Bennett 1994, pp. 96-97),
so let us say merely that an uneasiness is always closely connected to a desire
inasmuch as there is no desire without some uneasiness, however faint.
28 As testifies the sentence by which, in the second edition, Locke replaces the
quotation before last (cf. n.26 above): "'tis as much a perfection, that desire or
the power of Preferring should be determined by Good, as that the power of Act-
ing should be determined by the Will, and the certainer such determination is,
the greater the perfection" (§48).
29 That Locke takes the cases he discusses in §35 to be cases of weakness of the
will appears from his quoting Ovid: Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.
30 As appears in the following sentence, for example: "The Idea of it [an absent
good] indeed may be in the mind, and view'd as present there: but nothing will
be in the mind as a present good, able to counter-balance the removal of any
uneasiness, which we are under, till it raises our desire, and the uneasiness of
that has the prevalency in determining the will. Till then the Idea in the mind
of whatever good, is there only like other Ideas, the object of bare unactive
speculation; but operates not on the will, not sets us on work . . ." (§37).
311 am somewhat simplifying matters by leaving out of the picture two other fac-
tors that Locke considers: the time that it would take to attain the proposed
goods, and the probability of success.
32 For example, the reason for which we do not constantly endeavour to work
towards attaining the "Joys of Heaven," Locke explains, is that we seldom con-
sider such joys relevant to our desire for happiness; thus, the idea of such an
absent good produces little or no uneasiness (cf. §§38 and 44).
33 Locke 1982, pp. 410-11.
34 Cf., for example, §40.
35 Yaffe handles §47 in a way I fail to understand. He says: "the passage just
quoted seems to be [but, according to YafFe, is not really] an explicit statement
that an agent who has the power to suspend the effect of uneasiness in the
determination of the will and who (thereby) has the power to deliberate . . .
has (what is mistakenly called) freedom of will" (cf. Yaffe 2000, p. 52; cf. p. 19).
On the contrary, Locke should be taken at face value and as meaning what he
says. I therefore disagree with Yaffe's further claim that what Locke says is
improperly called freedom of will is to be identified with the following condi-
tion: "either [an agent's] volitions are determined by the good, or she has the
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power to bring it about that her volitions are determined by the good" (2000,
p. 54; cf. pp. 59-61). What Locke says, in §47, is improperly called free will is
obviously the power to suspend one's desires. (I also find Yaffe's reading of §22
strained, his efforts to convince notwithstanding [cf. 2000, pp. 27, 144-45]).
36 Cf. Ayers 1991, Vol. 2, p. 194.
37 In §50 Locke defines "standing still, where we are not sufficiently assured of
the way" as "to suspend any particular desire, and keep it from determining
the will, and engaging us in action."
38 "I desire it may be well consider'd, whether the great inlet, and exercise of all
the liberty Men have, are capable of, or can be useful to them, and that
whereon depends the turn of their actions, does not lie in this, that they can
suspend their desires, and stop them from determining their wills to any action,
till they have duly and fairly examin'd the good and evil of it, as far forth as
the weight of the thing requires" (§52).
39 We are "obliged to suspend the satisfaction of our desire in particular cases"
(§51). It is a "duty" of agents to "suspend their desires, and stop them from
determining their wills to any action, till they have duly and fairly examin'd
the good and evil of it" (§52).
40 Ayers 1991, Vol. 2, p. 194.
41 Cf. Chappell 1994, pp. 104-10.
42 Chappell 1994, p. 107.
43 Cf. Chappell 1994, pp. 106-107.
44 Rickless (2000) believes that Locke doubly restricts the scope of his argument in
§23: he restricts it to actions "that are to be considered only at the time they are
to be performed," and exclusively to actions that are "stoppings of processes"
(p. 50). According to Rickless, Locke's conclusion is: "A man considering pres-
ently stopping a process in which he is presently engaged is not free in respect
of the act of willing" (ibid., p. 52). I accept, of course, Rickless's first restriction,
since we have seen that Locke virtually says as much. But there are three reasons
for which I find it difficult to accept Rickless's second, more drastic, restriction,
that excludes actions that are, for instance, beginnings of processes. Firstly, the
textual evidence brought forth by Rickless seems insufficient: surely the mere
fact that Locke illustrates the point made in §23 by the example, in §24, of "a
Man that is walking, to whom it is proposed to give off walking" is no sure sign
that Locke believes, without saying so, that the argument of §23 does not apply
just as well to beginnings as to stoppings of processes, and to other modes of
acting. Secondly, according to Rickless, Locke makes the second restriction in
the second edition of the Essay (1694); however, in a letter of 1701 to van Lim-
borch Locke reiterates the point made in §23 in very general terms, without even
alluding to stoppings of processes: "when any action has been proposed to a
man, he cannot abstain from Volition; he must necessarily Will either that pro-
posed action or abstention from it" (Locke 1982, p. 410, my italics). Thirdly,
Rickless's second restriction appears to be needless if Locke's position in §23
can be correctly described as I have attempted to do above.
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45 Cf. Chappell 1994, pp. 107-10. Rickless proposes a very different reconstruc-
tion of Locke's argument in §25 (cf. Rickless 2000, pp. 56-65). I find Chappell's
reconstruction preferable to Rickless's because I agree with Chappell (and
with Yaffe 2000, p. 29) that Locke's argument is against freedom to will,
whereas Rickless thinks that "Section 25 contains an argument to the conclu-
sion that human beings are free with respect to their volitions . . . " (Rickless
2000, p. 65). Textual reasons against this reading are given in n.48 below.
46 Cf. Chappell 1994, pp. 111-12.
47 Rickless attributes to Locke the view that: "[human beings'] acts of willing to
perform volitions are not distinct from those volitions" (2000, p. 65). This is
close to my interpretation, but I am not sure we are saying the same thing,
because Rickless seems to say that there are willings to perform volitions, only
that they are not distinct from the latter.
48 II, 21, §25.1 agree with Chappell that "the absurdity lies . . . in an affirmative
answer to [the question]" (Chappell 1994, p. 108). In other words, Locke
intends us to see that the reply is obviously negative. This has been contested
by Rickless, who holds that "what makes [the] question absurd is precisely that
an [affirmative] answer to it is . . . obviously true" (Rickless 2000, p. 64; cf.
p. 63). Rickless is mistaken, for the lines quoted above from §25 are immedi-
ately preceded by the following: "Since then it is plain, that in most cases a Man
is not at liberty, whether he Will, or no; the next thing demanded is, Whether
a Man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases, Motion or Rest. This Ques-
tion carries the absurdity of it so manifestly in it self, that one might thereby
sufficiently be convinced, that Liberty concerns not the Will" (§25). If, as Rick-
less correctly says, it is the obviousness of the answer that makes the question
absurd (to ask), and if, as Locke says, the absurdity is such that "one might
thereby sufficiently be convinced, that Liberty concerns not the Will," then the
obvious answer is negative. In the second place, pace Rickless (cf. 2000, p. 64),
Locke cannot be saying that it is obvious that "a man can will, what he wills"
in the sense that whatever is actual is possible, for that reading is hardly com-
patible with what he says next: "A Question, which, I think, needs no answer:
and they who make a Question of it, must suppose one Will to determine the
Acts of another, and another to determinate that; and so on in infinitum" (§25).
Indeed, it does not follow from (1) one's doubting that whatever is actual is pos-
sible (as if one could doubt that!) that (2) one "must suppose one Will to deter-
mine the Acts of another," etc. The two points are unrelated.
49 Volition-1 as produced without deliberation is type-identical, but not token-
identical, to volition-1 as produced after deliberation, for the two volitions
would not have the same causes.
50 This is why Locke ridicules "an antecedent indifferency, as [his opponents] call
it": "For it is pretty hard to state i t . . . immediately after the Judgment of the
Understanding, and before the determination of the Will, because the deter-
mination of the Will immediately follows the Judgment of the Understanding."
The passage continues: "and to place Liberty in an indifferency, antecedent to
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the Thought and Judgment of the Understanding, seems to me to place Liberty
in a state of darkness, wherein we can neither see nor say any thing of it; at least
it places it in a subject incapable of it, no Agent being allowed capable of Lib-
erty, but in consequence of Thought and Judgment" (§71).
51 Locke 1982, pp. 328-29, my italics.
52 Locke 1982, p. 680.
53 Chappell (1994, p. 118) takes Locke, in this letter, to abandon the unavoidability
thesis. But if the thesis is restricted in the way I have tried to show, then there is
no reason to believe that Locke abandons it here or, as far as I can see, elsewhere.
54 Cf. Chappell 1994, p. 118.
55 Locke 1982, pp. 275-76. However, contrary to what van Limborch says, Locke
does not speak of "complete liberty" in this respect. Such freedom, we have
seen, is limited.
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